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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a student project examining mechanisms with which to 
attack Bluetooth-enabled devices. The paper briefly describes the protocol 
architecture of Bluetooth and the Java interface that programmers can use to 
connect to Bluetooth communication services. Several types of attacks are 
described, along with a detailed example of two attack tools, Bloover II and BT 
Info.  
Keywords: Bluetooth hacking, mobile phone hacking, wireless hacking 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bluetooth (BT) is one of the newer wireless technologies in use today. The 
name derives from that of Harald Blaatand, a tenth-century king of Denmark 
and Norway who united many independent Scandinavian tribes into a single 
kingdom. Bluetooth wireless communication technology is meant to be a 
universal, standard communications protocol for short-range communications, 
intended to replace the cables connecting portable and fixed electronic devices 
(Bluetooth SIG, 2008a). Operating in the 2.4 GHz range, Bluetooth is designed 
to allow wire-free communication over a range of short-haul distances in three 
power classes, namely, short range (10-100 cm), ordinary range (10 m), and 
long range (100 m) (Sridhar, 2008). Cell phones, personal digital assistants 
(PDAs), and smart phones are a few of the devices that commonly use 
Bluetooth for synchronizing email, sending messages, or connecting to a 
remote headset (Mahmoud, 2003a). What are less well known to users of 
Bluetooth devices are the risks that they incur due to various vulnerabilities of 
the technology. Bluehacking, bluejacking, marphing, bluesniping, and 
bluesnafting are just a few of the names given to the act of hacking a device via 
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Bluetooth (Laurie, Holtmann, & Herfurt, 2006). In this paper, we will discuss 
the technology needed to hack a cell phone, some of the tools, and precautions 
that users can take to help protect their Bluetooth devices. 
2. TECHNOLOGY 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the Bluetooth protocol stack in order to show the 
various attack vectors. The protocol layers of particular interest in this paper 
are: 
• Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP): Provides the 
data interface between higher layer data protocols and applications, 
and the lower layers of the device; multiplexes multiple data streams; 
and adapts between different packet sizes (Hole, 2008a, 2008d; 
Sridhar, 2008). 
• Radio Frequency Communications Protocol (RFCOMM): Emulates 
the functions of a serial communications interface (e.g., EIA-RS-232) 
on a computer. As Figure 1 shows, RFCOMM can be accessed by a 
variety of higher layer schemes, including AT commands, the Wireless 
Application Protocol (WAP) over the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) stack, or the Object Exchange 
(OBEX) protocol (Hole, 2008a, 2008e; Sridhar, 2008). 
• Object Exchange protocol: A vendor-independent protocol allowing 
devices to exchange standard file objects, such as data files, business 
cards (e.g., vCard files), and calendar information (e.g., vCal files). 
OBEX is a higher layer application and runs over different operating 
systems (e.g., PalmOS and Windows CE) and different 
communications protocols (e.g., Bluetooth and IrDA) (Gusev, n.d.). 
Most of the tools that are being used to hack Bluetooth phones use the Java 
programming language. In order for the software to work, the phone that is 
used to initiate the attack needs to support JSR-82, which is the official Java 
Bluetooth Application Programming Interface (API) (JCP, 2009). If the 
attacker’s phone does not support JSR-82, that phone cannot be used to attack 
other phones. This is an important note because although Bluetooth is widely 
available on cell phones, Java and JSR-82 support may not be. 
JSR-82 consists of two packages, namely, javax.bluetooth, which is the core 
Bluetooth API, and javax.obex, which is independent of the Bluetooth stack 
and provides APIs to other protocols, such as OBEX. The capabilities of JSR-
82 include the ability to (Hole, 2007; Mahmoud, 2003b): 
• Register services 
• Discover devices and services 
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• Establish L2CAP, RFCOMM, and OBEX connections between 
devices, using those connections to send and receive data (voice 
communication is not supported) 
• Manage and control the communication connections 
• Provide security for these activities 
Hole (2008a, 2008f) and Mahmoud (2003b) provide good overviews of how 
this code functions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Bluetooth protocol stack (Source: Tutorial-Reports.com, n.d.) 
 
3. BLUETOOTH SECURITY 
Bluetooth defines three security modes. Security Mode 1 provides no security 
enforcement, meaning that the device is effectively taking no steps to protect 
itself. Security Mode 2 enforces security at the service level. In this mode, a 
particular application might be relatively safe but no additional device 
protection has been added. Security Mode 3 is the highest level of security, 
employing link level enforced security mechanisms. Security Mode 3 protects 
the device from certain intrusions and, therefore, all services and applications 
(Bluetooth SIG, 2008b; Hole, 2008b; Laurie et al., 2006). 
All Bluetooth services have a default set level of security. Within the service 
level security, there are also three levels of security. Some services that require 
authorization and authentication in order to be used, some require 
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authentication only, and some are open to all devices (Bluetooth SIG, 2008b). 
Bluetooth devices themselves have two levels of security when describing 
other devices, namely trusted devices and untrusted devices. 
4. TYPES OF ATTACKS 
There are a variety of attacks that can be employed against Bluetooth devices, 
many with colorful names such as bluebugging, bluebumping, bluedumping, 
bluejacking, bluesmacking, bluesnarfing, bluespooofing [sic], bluestabbing, 
bluetoothing, and car whisperer. All take advantage of weaknesses in 
Bluetooth that allow an attacker unauthorized access to a victim's phone. It is 
imperative to note that while Bluetooth is commonly associated with networks 
limited in scope to 100 m, attacks on Bluetooth devices have been documented 
at ranges in excess of 1,500 m. using Bluetooone [sic] (Laurie, 2006). 
One common approach to hacking Bluetooth devices is to employ malformed 
objects, which are legal files exchanged between BT devices that contain 
invalid information, thus causing unexpected results. When a Bluetooth device 
receives a malformed object, such as a vCard or vCal file, the device may 
become unstable or fail completely. Alternatively, an attacker might also use a 
vCard or vCal file to inject commands allowing the attacker to take control of 
the device. This kind of an attack can be very harmful to a phone (E-Stealth, 
2008; Laurie et al., 2006). 
Some of the common attacks on Bluetooth devices include: 
• Bluebugging: An extraordinarily powerful attack mechanism, 
bluebugging allows an attacker to take control of a victim's phone 
using the AT command parser. Bluebug allows an attacker to access a 
victim's phone in order to make phone calls, send short message 
service (SMS) messages, read SMS messages stored on the phone, 
read and write contact list entries, alter phone service parameters, 
connect to the Internet, set call forwarding, and more (Bluebugging, 
n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006). 
• Bluejacking: The sending of unsolicited messages to open Bluetooth 
devices by sending a vCard with a message in the name field and 
exploiting the OBEX protocol (Bluejacking, 2009). 
• Bluesmack: A Bluetooth analog of the Ping-of-Death denial-of-service 
attack. This is a buffer overflow attack using L2CAP echo messages 
(Bluesmack, n.d.; Laurie, 2006). 
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• Bluesnarf and Bluesnarf++: Attacks allowing for the theft of 
information from a Bluetooth device using the OBEX Push Profile. 
The attacker needs only find a phone that has Bluetooth in 
discoverable mode. Bluesnarf works by a connection to most of the 
Object Push Profile services and the attacker retrieves the file names of 
known files from the Infrared Mobile Communications (IrMC) list 
instead of sending vCard information as expected. With these attacks 
the hacker can retrieve items such as the phonebook, calendar, and 
other personal information. With Bluesnarf++, the attacker has full 
read and write access to the file system of the phone. When an attacker 
is connected via the OBEX Push Profile, he/she has full access to the 
victim's phone without having to pair the two devices. The biggest risk 
with this function is that an attacker can delete crucial file system files, 
rendering the victim's device useless. In addition, the attacker can 
access any memory cards that are attached to the device (BlueSnarf, 
n.d.; Bluesnarfing, n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006). 
• Helomoto: Helomoto is functionally similar to the Bluebug attack but 
takes advantage of poor implementations of "trusted device" handling 
on some phones. As in bluebug attacks, the attacker pretends to send a 
vCard to an unauthenticated OBEX Push Profile on the victim's phone. 
Once started, the attacker interrupts the transfer process and the victim 
then lists the attacker’s phone as a trusted device. The attacker can then 
connect to the victim's phone and take control of the device by issuing 
AT commands. This attack is so-named because it was first discovered 
on Motorola phones (Helomoto, n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006). 
These attacks are only a few that can be launched against Bluetooth interfaces 
in phones, laptops, and even automobiles. E-Stealth (2008) and Laurie et al. 
(2006) offer information about a wide range of attacks that can be launched via 
Bluetooth vulnerabilities. 
5. TOOLS FOR ATTACK 
There are many options that a user can choose from when looking to attack a 
Bluetooth phone. Web sites such as E-Stealth (http://www.e-stealth.com/) and 
FlexiSPY (http://www.flexispy.com/) offer commercial products to allow one 
party to eavesdrop or attack another party's Bluetooth device, ostensibly to trap 
an unfaithful spouse, catch an unscrupulous employee, or monitor a teenage 
child. These are merely commercial versions of hacker tools that include 
Bloover, Bloover II, BT Info, BT_File_Explorer, ISeeYourFiles, MiyuX, and 
STMBlueS (D3scene, 2008; E-Stealth, 2008; Getjar, 2008; Laurie et al., 2006; 
SE-NSE, 2006). Many of these programs (like so many hacker tools such as 
Back Orifice and SubSeven), are distributed as "management tools" but what 
differentiates them from bona fide management tools is that the managed party 
may not be aware that the program is running. And, like any "management" 
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tool, these programs are often platform-dependent so that they work best on 
certain brands of devices and may not work on all devices; MiyuX, for 
example, works best on Sony Ericsson phones. A nice collection of all of these 
tools in one package can be found at tradebit 
(http://www.tradebit.com/filedetail.php/5006527-basic-bluetooth-spy-
software). 
5.1 Testing the Software 
The first author experimented with the feasibility of actually using this 
software in a real environment, employing Bloover II (which allows an 
attacker to obtain information from a victim's phone) and BT Info (which 
allows an attacker to control the victim’s phone). Both were part of the 
Ultimate Bluetooth Mobile Phone Spy Software New Edition 2008 available 
from E-Stealth (http://www.e-stealth.com/). 
It is worth noting that this software claims to be useable on any Bluetooth 
phone to hack any other Bluetooth phone but, like so many software claims, 
this one was overstated. Initial attempts to use the software on a Sanyo SCP-
7050 failed because the software could not be installed. Later, the first author 
purchased a BlackBerry Curve. Although the software user guide provided 
instructions on how to install the software on a BlackBerry, the install failed 
when an error stated that the phone did not support the correct Java API. 
The phones that were used successfully for testing throughout this project were 
United Kingdom versions of a Sony Ericsson W550i and a W800i. Theses 
phone both support JSR-82 enabling them to run the software. In order to 
actually use the phones, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card was needed 
for each phone. The SIM card does not actually need to be active if the attacker 
is only going to be probing and manipulating the target phone and not making 
calls. Throughout the testing for this project both phones used inactive SIM 
cards. 
5.2 Bloover II 
Bloover (also known as Blooover), standing for Bluetooth Wireless 
Technology Hoover, is a proof-of-concept application. Bloover II is a second-
generation version of a program that consists of several different types of 
attacks, including Bluebug, Bluesnarf, Helomoto, and the use of malformed 
objects. Breeder is a related program that propagates Bloover II clients (Laurie 
et al., 2006). 
The attack software package that was purchased included a program called 
Bloover II. Once a JSR-82 enabled phone was found, the program installed 
easily. As for running the program, it seemed to always halt on one of the 
processes. One of the processes that the software kept halting on was when the 
program was running the “HeloMoto” attack. During this attack, the hacking 
phone tries to “plant” an entry into the victim’s phonebook. Within the options 
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of the Bloover II program, the hacker can chose which attacks they would like 
to use on the victim’s phone. When going through and trying each attack by 
itself, the software would always halt on some process. The only operation that 
could be conducted was the initial audit of the phone to get basic information 
about the phone. 
Figure 2 shows a series of screen shots using Bloover II from a W550i phone 
to access a W800i phone. Figure 2a shows the attacker's phone scanning for 
another Bluetooth phone; in Figure 2b, a device named W800i is found. The 
audit feature of Bloover is initiated (Figure 2c) and results (Figure 2d) include 
the target device's address, communications channel for communication with 
the headset and other functional profiles, the RFCOMM channel, and phone 
contact information. A specific attack type (Bluebug in this case) is selected 
from the Quick Config menu (Figure 2d). 
 
    
  2a)   2b)   2c) 
 
  
   2d)      2e) 
 
Figure 2. Bloover II screen shots. 
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5.3 BT Info 
Because of increased functionality, a larger amount of time was spent using a 
program called BT Info. With this program, the attacker can completely control 
the target device if the attacker can become paired with the target. Once the 
Bluetooth pairing takes places, the attacker can perform a broad set of 
functions on the target phone, ranging from placing a phone call or sending an 
SMS message to turning the phone off or performing a master reset. The 
hardest part for the attacker, in fact, is finding a device with an open Bluetooth 
connection or tricking someone into pairing his or her phone. 
 
    
         3a)   3b) 
 
   
         3c)   3d) 
 
Figure 3. BT Info screen shots (device pairing). 
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Figure 3 shows a series of screen shots of an attacker's phone (W550i) pairing 
up with a target phone (W800i). Once pairing has been successfully 
accomplished, BT Info displays a menu of possible actions (Figure 4a). The 
Informations screen (Figure 4b) allows the attacker to retrieve basic 
information about the target phone, such as the phone manufacturer and model, 
firmware version, battery level, signal level, International Mobile Equipment 
Identity (IMEI), and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). 
The Ringing screen (Figure 4c) allows the attacker to control the ringing on the 
target phone. This option allows the attacker to force the target phone to start 
ringing and not stop until the target phone is turned off or the attacker issues 
the Stop command. Within the Ringing option, the attacker is able to select the 
type of ringtone to start. 
 
  
         4a)   4b) 
 
  
        4c)    4d) 
Figure 4. BT Info screen shots (initial menu functions). 
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The Calling menu (Figure 4d) offers four options, allowing the attacker to dial 
any number, hang up a call, place a current call on hold, or redial the last 
number. An attacker can use the Calling option, for example, to call a second 
phone owned by the attacker in order to listen in on the victim's conversations. 
If the target phone has a speaker function that operates when the phone is 
closed, the attacker can still be able to establish a call and listen in. From the 
main Actions menu, the attacker can also change the display language that the 
phone uses. 
 
  
     5a)    5b) 
 
  
    5c)    5d) 
 
Figure 5. BT Info screen shots (Keys functions). 
 
The Keys function (Figure 5a) is a feature of BT Info that allows an attacker to 
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watch the keys that the victim pushes as they are being pushed or allows an 
attacker to remotely press keys on the victim's phone. For the latter function, 
the attacker can access the target phone's "joystick" keys (Figure 5b) or 
individual keypad keys (Figure 5c). The control function of BT Info (Figure 
5d) allows the attacker to remotely access the target's control keys, including 
volume control, media player, and camera. 
 
BT Info also gives an attacker access to the target phone's text messages. The 
SMS action (Figure 6a), for example, allows the attacker to select a mailbox on 
the victim's phone and retrieve the complete contents of all SMS messages. 
Some of the other actions are simply informational, including the temperature 
of the phone, what Bluetooth devices are trusted on the victim’s phone, what 
sound, if any, the phone makes when a button is pressed, the memory status, 
and what action forces a keylock. 
 
The Operations action (Figure 6b) has several options. Automatic Keylock 
gives an attacker the ability to automatically lock the victim's when it is 
unlocked; i.e., when the victim unlocks the phone, it will automatically relock 
itself. The Random Time and Date Change option randomly changes the date 
and time on the victim's roughly a hundred times per minute. Similarly, the 
Random Alarm option randomly sets the victim phone's alarm settings.  
 
   
  6a)    6b)    6c) 
 
Figure 6. BT Info screen shots (miscellaneous). 
 
The Custom Command function (Figure 6c) allows an attacker to power down 
or force a master reset on a victim's phone. This function can also be used to 
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execute whatever AT commands are available on the target phone. BT Info 
also has a Phonebook function that allows an attacker to read the victim’s 
phonebook and recent call history. 
BT Info was tested using several different Bluetooth phones and was employed 
most successfully between the two Sony Ericsson phones mentioned above. 
The first author was able to use one of the Sony Ericsson phones to connect 
with a Motorola Razr, although the functionality of BT Info was somewhat 
limited, only allowing call initiation and access to SMS messages. 
Functionality of BT Info will vary by the model of both attacker and target 
phone (E-Stealth, 2008). 
A video of the first author using BT Info between the two Sony Ericsson 
phones can be found at http://c3di.champlain.edu/TR/BTInfo_Browning.m4v 
(11 minutes, 350 MB). 
6. PRECAUTIONS 
As with so many aspects of security, user awareness and vigilance is the best 
defense against the kinds of attacks described here. The best way to protect a 
device, obviously, is to simply turn Bluetooth off. A device cannot be hacked 
via a Bluetooth attack vector if other Bluetooth devices cannot see it. Some 
devices come with Bluetooth turned on by default so users need to check this 
setting. 
If Bluetooth must be enabled, the user can set the device to be hidden 
(analogous to not broadcasting the network name on a wireless network). 
Setting a device to be invisible will still allow Bluetooth communications to 
function but will only allow connections to trusted devices that have been 
previously configured. This protection is not perfect, however; if an attacker 
finds out that a particular device is trusted, they can use their own Bluetooth 
device to masquerade as the trusted device and will then be able to connect to 
the target phone (this is a common spoofing attack). 
If a user must use Bluetooth, they should also only turn it on as needed. In 
addition, users should change their Bluetooth personal identification number 
(PIN) every month or so. Changing the PIN requires that any Bluetooth devices 
that the user regularly employs will need to be re-paired, but it also makes it a 
bit harder for attackers. Attacks succeed because many users will balk at 
constantly turning their Bluetooth port on and off, or changing the PIN, but at 
the very least users should change the default PIN when they first get their 
Bluetooth enabled device (Jansen & Scarfone, 2008). 
7. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this project was to determine how real the threat is of attacks to 
Bluetooth-enabled devices and how easy such attacks are to launch. After 
spending a relatively short amount of time and a few dollars, it is clear how 
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vulnerable Bluetooth technology really is. The idea that someone could listen 
to all conversations a victim is having without them even knowing, or have 
their text messages read, are key examples of the dangers of Bluetooth. Even 
worse, an attacker can initiate a call to someone or text someone without the 
victim ever knowing. The only way a user would be able to catch this activity 
is if they were to look through their call log or look at the sent messages on 
their phone. Even that might be insufficient, as the attacker can delete the 
records of their nefarious activity and the victim would never know until their 
bill comes out. The victim would only know about unusual behavior if they 
carefully look at their bill, which is increasingly problematic since many 
people do not even look at their detailed call records. And even if someone 
complains that they "did not make a call on this date and time," the mobile 
service carrier has proof that the call was made from this device because, 
indeed, it was. 
Users need to be made aware of the vulnerabilities of these devices so that they 
can employ them more effectively, safely, and confidently. 
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